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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE ~lATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
BEK B. ELLER.BECK, also kno,vn as B. 
B. ELLERBECK, 
D-eceased. 
WITTON B. ELLERBECK, 
Contestant and App·ella.nt) 
-vs.-
RUTH C·LAYTON HAWS, 
Proponent and Re:spondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF' THE· c·ASE 
Case No. 8010 
This is an appeal from an order admitting the will of 
Ben B. Eller beck to probate (R. 46, 48). 
Mrs. Ruth Clayton Haws on May 2, 1952, petitioned 
the court for the probate of an olographic will in the 
matter of the estate of Ben B. Eller beck, deceased. There-
after, Witton B. Ellerbeck, brother and only heir of the 
deceased, filed his petition in opposition to the probate 
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of said will. His opposition to the probate of the will 
was based upon two grounds : First, that the said Ben 
B. Ellerbeck was not competent to make a Last 'Yill and 
Testament because of unsoundness of 1nind and second. 
because the will was a contingent or conditional 'vill and 
was only to take effect if he did not survive the sirlmess 
then being experienced by him in the Holy Cross Hospi-
tal. 
A pretrial was held January 5, 1953, and the eourt 
took under advisement the contention of contestant that 
the will was contingent. On January 7, 1953, the court 
ruled that "the will is not ambiguous and that the will 
is absolute, and is not conditional" (R. 25). 
At the time set for trial the contestant did not sub1nit 
any evidence concerning the mental incompeten~y of the 
deceased, but still asserted that the will was conditional 
(R. 31). 
The court thereupon ruled that the will should be 
admitted to probate ( R. 4'2') and signed the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Admitting 'Viii to 
Probate (R. 44 to 46). 
The only contention here made by the conte~tant 
is that the will is conditional or contingent and should 
not have been admitted to probate. 
The testimony established that the deceased, Ben 
B. Ellerbeck, was admitted to the Holy Cross Hospital 
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about ~ :00 p.In. on September 27, 1951 ( R. 38). The 
proponent "\Yent to the hospital to see Mr. Ellerbeck. 
She testified that he "\vas very sick and: 
~'Q. And he "\vas afraid he was going to die, wasn't 
heJ? 
..:\._. Well, I guess he "\vas; I don't know." (R. 38) 
The \Yill "Tas made on September 29, 1951 (R. 36). 
Examination of the "\vill discloses that it is on the front 
side of a statement from the Granite Mart, Inc. to R .. 
Clayton Ha,vs, the proponent, for ladies shoes apparently 
purchased August 17th. 
The \vill is short and we quote it for the convenience 
of the Court : • 
"Sept. 29, 1951 
''To whom it may concern: 
Being in the Holy Cross Hospital from di-
gestive and other troubles, in the event that I do 
not survive, Mrs. Ruth Clayton Haws is to take 
full charge of my home and such little business as 
may exist there. F'urther, she is to have my com-
plete portion of the estate left by my father, 
namely Witton W. Ellerbeck. 
Signed-
Ben B. Ellerbeck 
P.S.. I appoint Mrs. Ruth Clayton Haws to serve 
as executrix without bond. 
Signed B. B. Ellerbeck" 
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The deceased was in the hospital about one "~eek 
(R. 35), recovered fro1n his illness and later was seen to 
work around his yard and shop and appeared to be all 
right during that period of time (R. 39). He died on the 
30th day of April, 1952 (R. 46). 
S.T·ATEMENT OF POINT RELIED UPON BY 
APPELLANT F:OR REVERSAL OF JUDG}\IENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
WILL ADMITTED TO PROBATE WAS ABSOLUTE AND 
WAS NOT CONDITIONAL OR CONTINGENT AND IN AD-
MITTING SAID WILL TO PROBATE . 
• ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
WILL ADMITTED TO PROBATE WAS ABSOLUTE AND 
WAS NOT CONDITIONAL OR CONTINGENT AND IN AD-
MITTING SAID WILL TO PROBATE. 
The courts are unanimous in holding that if a '"ill 
is contingent or conditional it should not be ad1nitted 
to probate unless the condition set forth in the will has 
occurred as therein contemplated. In 57 Ant. Jur. 453, 
Wills, Sec. 671, the foregoing rule is set forth as follow~: 
"A conditional or contingent will is one whieh 
is dependent for its operation upon the happening 
of a specified condition or contingeney. If t.he 
condition fails, the will is inoperative and void 
thereafter, unless it is republished." 
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·The follo,ving definition of a contingent will is given 
in 1 Page on TT'ills (Lifetime Edition), page 204, Sec. 
92: 
" .. A. contingent or conditional will is one, by 
the tern1s of vvhich, the will is not to take effect 
unless so1ne condition precedent has happened, 
or \Yhich is not to take effect, if some specified 
condition has happened. Because of statutory re-
quirements as to the form in which a will must be 
drawn, this condition must appear upon the face 
of the will itself." 
In determining whether or not this is a conditional 
will the intention of the maker of the will is controlling. 
57 Am. Jtttr. 454, Sec. 672, sets forth the rule as follows: 
"Whether or not a will is to be regarded as 
contingent depends upon the intention of the 
testator. 
* * * 
'"To hold a will contingent or conditional, it 
must reasonably ap·pear that the testator intended 
the will not to take effect unless a stated condition 
was fulfilled." 
In Bagnall v. Bagnall, (Texas) 2·25 S.W. 2d 401, 
the court clearly set forth the considerations controlling 
a determination of whether or not the will is conditional. 
That court stated at page 402: 
"In determining whether a will is contingent 
or otherwise, the thing to be determined is whether 
the happening of the possibility referred to is a 
condition precedent to the operation of the will, 
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or whether the possibility of the happening "·as 
only a statement of the 1notive or inducement 
which led to the preparation and execution of the 
instrument. If the condition n1entioned is a con-
dition precedent to the validity of the "·ill, ~uch 
contingency must have taken place in order to 
entitle the will to probate; if the possibility nlen-
tioned is only the inducement \Yhich prompted the 
making of the will then such will is effective upon 
the testator's death even though such event doe~ 
not take place." 
Illustrations of contingent wills are giYen at 57 Am. 
Jur. 4551 Wills, Sec. 673: 
"* * * Perhaps the clearest illustration of a 
conditional or contingent will is where the testator 
refers in the will to his possible death upon a trip 
contemplated by him, especially a prospective Yoy-
age overseas, from the dangers consequent upon 
military service, from a sickness with \vhich the 
testator was afflicted when he executed the 'rill, 
or from a surgical operation to which it \vas then 
in prospect he would he required to submit, as a 
condition of the effectiveness of the will. The will 
becomes unconditional upon the occurrence of the 
testator's death in the Jnanner or under the ('ir-
cumstances stated in the condition." 
The situation presented by the case at bar is one 
which clearly demonstrates that the will in question is a 
conditional one. Mr. Ellerbeck was very sick and "·as 
taken to the hospital two days before the will was utade. 
The Record shows that he was very concerned about 
his business and some of the things that should be done 
in connection with it (R. 38, 39). ThP will itself is on a 
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state1nent. lTndoubtedly the 'vill \vas hurriedly written. 
Other,vise In ore for1nali ties 'vould have been taken and 
certainly at least a blank piece of paper \vould have been 
obtained. ,,~ e sub1nit that this is some indication that the 
"Till "Tas regarded merely as a thing to take care of the 
situation if ~Ir. Ellerbeck died while in the hospital and 
from the illness he then had. The language of the will 
clearly discloses an intent that it was not to take effect 
in the event he did survive or, to put it as it is in the 
will, it \vas only to take effect "in the event that I do not 
survive". It is hard to believe that there could be stronger 
language used by the deceased to express the thought 
and intention that he was only taking care of the situa-
tion if he should die while there at the hospital. 
The subject of contingent wills has been annotated 
at 11 A.L.R. 846, supplemented at 79 .A.L.R. 1168. One 
of the things that becomes apparent upon reading the 
cases and these annotations is that wherever the pur-
ported testator has been ill when he makes the will and 
has· placed therein words referring to such illness and 
that the bequests are made in the event he does not sur-
vive, the courts have held the wills conditional. 
Where such matters as journeys, voyages or military 
service are involved the courts have sometimes held the 
wills conditional - sometimes not conditional. One of 
the n1ost recent cases on this rna tter is the case of Bagnall 
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v. Bagnall, (Texas) 225 S.W. 2d 401, reversing 222 S.,r. 
2d 1015. In that case the testator \vas anticipating a 
hunting and fishing trip. Before he left he n1ade the 
following will: 
"Remember me W. W. Bagnall by this. If 
anything happens to me. While gone. All 1ny be-
longings and estate goes to James B. Bagnall 
Brother of mine." 
He returned from the trip. He died some little tiJne 
later while performing the usual duties of his occupation. 
The court held that this was a contingent will and denied 
it probate. In reaching this result the court stated: 
"In this case the writer of the instrument be-
gins the conditional clause with the conjunction 
'if', which clearly expresses a condition; it means 
'provided' or 'in case that'. Then, as if to empha-
size what he has in mind, the testator adds a~ a 
separate sentence the words 'while gone'. In this 
connection it is to be noted that the word gone has 
a well defined meaning. It means 'departed', 
'absent', 'to depart or pass from one station in 
space to another which is implied as farther 
away'." 
Analyzing the language of the will in the case at bar, 
a similar result must be reached. No stronger words 
could be used showing a condition than the words here 
used, "in the event that I do not survive". 
Wilson v·. Higgason, 207 Ark. 32, 178 S.W. 2d R55, 
is a case involving a situation where the individual was 
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ill and in the hospital. The purported testator wrote a 
letter to one Lillie Higgason. He referred to the fact 
that he \vas in the hospital sick and that there were a 
number of things that he should do. He then stated: 
ht: * * Now Lillie since I have made you 1ny 
beneficiary in all my insurance I want you, in 
event that I should die any time soon, to collect 
all my insurance and if I have any money left any-
where I would want you to get it and divide it 
equally * * *. 
* * * 
"* * * I'm just doing this so in case I should 
die any time soon you would know how I would 
want my little mite disposed. of * * *". 
This will was made March 10, 19129 and the testator 
died September 8, 1941, some twelve and one-half years 
later. It was held that this will showed an intent that 
distribution should be made in accord with it only in 
case of the death of the testator "any time soon". 
Another case involving sickness is that of Dougherty 
v. Holscheider, 40 ·Tex. Civ. App. 31, 88 S.W. 11'13. The 
will there involved provided as follows: 
"Friend Jim I am going to start to Monterey 
tomorrow to have a surgical operation performed 
on me, and possibly I may never get back alive. 
The doctors have said that it would not be danger-
ous, but in case anything should happen I want 
you to see what I have left." 
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A second letter involved stated as follo,vs: 
"I wrote you some weeks ago and told you 
that I intended undergoing an operation, and that 
before doing so that I would write you and tell you 
what to do with my stuff in case anything hap-
pened to me." 
This was held to be contingent, and the court stated: 
"We think the words of the letter indicate 
clearly that it was written merely as an expedient 
in case of death resulting from the operation. In 
both letters he desires certain things done 'in case 
anything happened' evidently in connection 'vith 
the operation." 
One of the best discussions of this subject is found in 
the case of Walker v. Hibbard, 185 Ky. 795, 215 S.W. 800, 
11 A.L.R. 832. The following will was considered: 
"June 8, 1917 
HDear Aunt Mintie:- On Sunday evening I 
go to St. Elizabeth's Hospital to have a slight op-
eration. I do not anticipate any trouble, but one 
never knows. If anything should happen to Ine, I 
want you please to do this for me. See that every-
thing I have in the world goes to George B. Goin-
ersall. He is dearer to 1ne than anything in this 
world, and he deserves it. You n1ay think thi~ i~ 
too much, but I don't believe you will, and it is 
1ny wish. If there is anything around the house 
you want, of course it is yours. The sideboard be-
longs to Sam Long. You have been far better to 
me than I deserve, and I love you better than you 
will ever know. 
With very n1uch love, 
~fame S. Long." 
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She recovered fron1 the operation and did not die until 
December, 1917. 
The "\Yill \Yas dated June 8. She went to the hospi-
tal June lOth, left the hospital June 21st and finally de-
livered the purported will to the beneficiary Gomersall 
on June 2-::l:th, a date after she had recovered from the con-
ternplated operation. After reviewing many authorities 
the court concluded that the will in question was contin-
gent and, therefore, the lower courts were correct in re-
fusing to admit it to probate. In so far as material here, 
the court concluded the law to be as follows : 
"It may also, as we think, be fairly gathered 
from all the authorities that, if the will is so 
phrased as to clearly show that it was intended to 
take effect only upon the happening of the par-
ticular event set forth in the paper as the reason 
for writing it, or, putting it in other words, if it 
was written only to make provision against a 
death that might occur on account of or as a re-
sult of the specific thing assigned as a reason for 
writing the will, it will be a contingent will; but if 
the causes assigned for writing it are merely a 
general statement of the reasons or a narrative 
of conditions that induced the testator to make 
his will, it will not be a contingent will, although it 
may set forth probable or anticipated dangers 
or conditions that induced the testator to write 
't " 1 • 
In the case at bar the conditional character of the 
language of the will is more certain than in the Walker 
case. In the case at bar the deceased referred to the fact 
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that he \vas in the Holy Cross Hospital and, again, he 
used that very strong language "in the event that I do 
not survive". Considering the language in the Walker 
case in relation to the will being considered by us it at 
once becomes apparent that under the Walker case this is 
a contingent will. The court there said : 
"* * * She did not intend, when this paper 
vv-as written, that it should be a pern1anent dis-
position of her property, or that it should be her 
last will, no matter when or where she died, or 
fro1n what cause, but only that it should be her 
last will in the event she died in St. Elizabeth's 
Hospital as a result of the operation. F·ear of 
the fatal result that might follow the operation 
was the moving cause, and the only cause, that 
influenced her to write it, and it was only this 
probable calamity that she wanted to provide 
her. It was a temporary disposition, intended to 
meet a present emergency, and when the einer-
gency it was intended to provide against passed, 
the paper ceased to have any force or effect. Thi~ 
letter is not susceptible of any other construe-
tion." 
The court then used the strongest language that it 
could think of for a contingent will and it reads like the 
will in the case at bar. The court stated: 
"If she had said in the letter, 'I only intend 
this disposition of 1ny estate to be effective in thP. 
event I do not survive the operation I an1 about to 
sub1nit to,' it would not manifP~t her purpo~P in 
writing it n1ore clearly than the words she enl-
ployed." 
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The proponent here testified that she kept the 'vill 
until after "Jfr. Ellerbeck returned home and that when 
she returned it to him he told her that he would show 
her w·here he \Yould put it, 'vhich he did (R.36). This 
TValJ.t'er case completely answers any contention that 
could be n1ade on behalf of the proponent because of this 
conduct. _A .. s noted above the testator delivered the will 
to the beneficiary after recovery a.nd this was held not to 
be a republication and that the intent at the time of mak-
ing the 'vill 'vould be con trolling with particular signi-
ficance being given to the language of the will itself. 
In Davis v. D·avis, 107 Miss. 2·45·, 65 So. 2·41, the testa-
tor while lying in a hospital awaiting an operation wrote 
a letter to his mother which stated in part: 
"Should I not get over this operation I want 
you and Papa to take charge of everything I've 
got." 
The court held that this will was contingent. 
In Ellison v. Smoot's Adm., 2'86 Ky. 768, 151 s·.w. 
2d 1017, the testatrix wrote a letter to her sister in which 
she expressed despondency and stated that she didn't 
feel very strong. She then wrote: 
"If I can't live through it and anything hap-
pens to me I want you to have what I have." 
The testatrix did not die until two years and four 
1nonths later. It wa.s held that the will was conditional 
and should not be admitted to probate. 
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The two annotations above cited are subdiYided "~ith 
reference to the occasion of peril "'"hich it "Tas contended 
would make the will contingent. It is to be noted that 
there are five cases cited having relation to "death from 
sickness or operation" and in each instance the occasion 
being referred to with particularity was held to consti-
tute a conditional 'viii. Re Cook, 173 Cal. 465, 160 Pac. 
553, Davis v. Davis, 107 Miss. 245, 65 S.o. 241, Dougherty 
v. H olscheider, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 88 S.W. 1113, 
Underwood v. Rutan, 101 Ohio St. 306, 128 N.E. 7~, Elli-
son v. Smoot's Adm., 286 Ky. 768, 151 S.W. 2d 1017. 
Many other cases could be cited where the contingency 
relied upon was a return from a trip, voyage or military 
service, but we submit that the foregoing cases relating 
to recovery from a particular illness are the cases in 
point. The other cases are contained in the annotation:-\ 
heretofore referred to. 
Contingency of a will depends largely upon 'vhether 
the peril in question is referred to as the occasion or in-
ducement for making the will or whether it is 1nade a 
condition on the happening of which the will is to be op-
erative. 
The will at bar refers to the hospitalization and sick-
ness as both. In other words, it was not only the oe<·a-
sion or inducement, but also failure to survive there-
fronl 'vas the condition necessary to make the will op-
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erative. This is pointed up in the case of Dougherty v. 
Dougherty, 4 l\let. (Ky.) 25. The will there involved read 
in part as follows: 
HI, James Dougherty, of the county of Frank-
lin and state of Kentucky, hath this day made this 
my last will and testament, as I intend starting 
in a few days to the state of Missouri, and should 
anything happen that I should not return alive, 
n1y wish is that all of my land and negroes, and 
all I leave behind me, after paying my just debts, 
be kept in the hands of the bishop of the diocese of 
Scott county, as trustee * * *". 
The testator made the contemplated trip to Missouri 
and returned home and died later. The court held the 
will to be contingent and, in doing so, stated: 
"The words in relation to the trip to Missouri 
contain two ideas: the one a reason for making 
· a will, and the other the condition upon which the 
paper is to take effect as a will. The exp-ression, 
'as I intend starting in a few days to the state 
of Missouri,' refers to the contemplated trip as the 
reason for making the will; and the remainder 
of the language, 'and should anything happen 
that I should not return alive, my wish is,' etc., 
makes, in unequivocal terms, a contingency or 
condition upon which the paper was to operate as 
his will." 
Let us turn to a closer analysis of the will in the 
light of the foregoing authorities. The first words estab-
lish the inducement or motive for the making of the will. 
"Being in the Holy Ctoss Hospital from digestive and 
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other troubles". It refers with particularity to the place 
and troubles he was experiencing. Next co1nes language 
which has nothing to do with motive or induce1nent. These 
next words refer to the particular event of his hospitali-
zation and the causes thereof. These are the "·ords of 
condition. They clearly show upon what condition this 
will is to become effective, "* * * in the event I do not 
survive". This could only refer to a failure to survire 
from his then hospitalization and sickness. It could not 
refer to the general proposition of survival. In such 
sense none of us will survive. But he particularized the 
survival of which he was writing and that \vas his hospi-
talization in the Holy Cross Hospital and his sickness 
there. 
After the foregoing he states that the proponent is to 
take charge of his home and such little business as might 
exist there. He then writes: "Further, she is to havP IllY 
co1nplete portion of the estate left by my father * * *". 
We submit that the first words of the will establish the 
inducement for making it and the condition upon which 
it is to be effective. Any doubt of this is dispelled by th(\ 
use of the word "further". The only sense that ean bP 
given to this word ties the balance of the language in 
with the preceding language. Further, <H·eor(ling to \Yeb-
ster means as here used "in addition'' HnlorPovPr" 
' ' ' ' , 
"furthermore''. Its use establish('s the intention of the 
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deceased to make ·this dependent upon the condition of 
his survival and to make the entire will stand or fall upon 
such condition. 
As a P.S. he writes "I appoint Mrs. Ruth Clayton 
Haws to serve as executrix without bond." All this does 
is place in legal language that which is already set forth 
in the first of the will. She is to be in charge of his es-
tate-but in \vhat event. That has been made conditional 
upon his survival fron1 the particular hospitalization and 
sickness referred to. 
We submit that the will must be considered as a 
whole. It was made to take care of a particular emer-
gency which had arisen in the life of Ben B. Ellerbeck 
whereby he sought as clearly as he could to make dis-
position of his property in the event he did not survive 
that emergency. 
We submit that this will is contingent and that it 
was meant only for the purpose of making a temporary 
disposition of property to meet a particular condition 
which existed, to wit, his fear that he might not sur-
vive his then hospitalization. 
The evidence establishes that he survived and re-
covered from this hospitalization and since the condi-
tion upon which the effectiveness of this will depended 
did not occur it did not become the will of Ben B. Eller-
beck and it should not have been admitted to probate. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that this Court should re-
verse the order of the trial court, directing the lo,ver 
court to refuse to admit said will to probate. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
Attorneys for Contestant and 
Appellant 
530 Judge Building 
·salt Lake City, Utah 
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